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11 Introduction
A commonly held view is that ﬁscal federalism promotes innovative public programs,
speeds up the process of policy experimentation and its diﬀusion. This view has been
recently expressed by the U.S federal government with regards to abatement technolo-
gies. The administration’s chief climate negotiator, Harlan Watson, defended the U.S
climate policy listing a variety of initiatives by states and communities. This ‘bottom-up
approach’ is based on the fact that states are like ‘laboratories where new and creative
ideas and methods can be applied and shared with others and inform federal policy.’1
This view is rooted in the argument that the division of the economy into a number
of independent localities gives them the opportunity to experiment with policies. With
several jurisdictions experimenting, the likelihood of ﬁnding the best policy is higher
than if the control of the policy choice is left to the central government.2 This view is
most vividly summarized in the following citation by Justice Brandeis:
‘It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’3
While this statement has received widespread support, recent theoretical analysis sug-
gests the contrary: a decentralized system is conducive to producing fewer policy in-
novations than a centralized one. This might be the case, for instance, either because
of political risk—as in Rose-Ackerman (1980)—or because of a horizontal information
externality, as in Strumpf (2002). This latter contribution considers a model in which
local policymakers decide on policy experiments the outcomes of which are correlated
across states. This correlation creates a learning externality and therefore an incentive
1Herald Tribune, December 11, 2003, p.1, ‘Warming feud: states vs. Bush team’, by A. Revkin and
J. Lee. For further examples of innovative policies, see Strumpf [9].
2See, for instance, the insightful survey of Oates [6]), but also Inman and Rubinfeld [2], Kollman et
al. [4], and Besley [1]. For an early empirical analysis of the diﬀusion of innovations among the U.S
states see Walker [10]. For a recent study at the local level, see Rincke [7].
3Brandeis, J. dissenting, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
2for the policymakers to free-ride on each other’s innovative eﬀorts. This incentive to free
ride leads, typically, to under-experimentation relative to the social optimum that could
be generated by a unitary government.4
An important aspect that is insightfully discussed but not formally investigated by
Rose-Ackerman [8] and Strumpf [9] (section 4.3) concerns the federal political institutions
and, more importantly, the electoral incentives faced by the state policymakers in a
federal system. It is quite common observation that in federal systems regional governors
run for federal oﬃce. Consider, for instance, the U.S experience. With the exception
of George Bush senior all of America’s past ﬁve presidents previously have been state
governors. The same is true, to give another example, for Germany where four out of
the last ﬁve chancellors were ex-premiers of federal states. Though this does not show
the innovativeness of the governors prior to the federal elections, it does show their level
of political aspirations.
Undoubtedly, the implementation of new and unknown public policies is more
demanding than running ‘business as usual’, since it requires imaginative leadership on
the part of a governor rather than operational routine. If innovative public policies are
viewed by the electorate as a signal of imaginative leadership, and hence a reasonable
proxy for ability, one would expect that political aspirations are interdependent with the
choice of public policies. It is so reasonable to assume that in federal contests, being
innovative at the state level, positively inﬂuence the voters’ perception of the ability of
a governor standing for federal oﬃce.5 In this paper we incorporate political aspirations
for federal oﬃce into an analysis of policy experimentation by local jurisdictions and
identify the forces at work that shape the incentives to experiment in a federal system.
4This conﬂict (and the need for more research on this topic) between the conventional wisdom and
the conclusions arrived at by the contributions of Rose-Ackerman [8] and Strumpf [9] is also emphasized
in Oates [6]. Besley [1] stresses the lack of understanding of the interaction of political institutions and
policy experimentation.
5This view is shared by political observers too. In a commentary, for example, J. Podhoretz notes,
‘...although he is not a bold politician, Bush is an innovator. On all these issues [education, social
security and medicare] he has fresh proposals that derive from state and local politics – from experi-
ments by the Republican governors like himself who have come to dominate the 50 state capitals.’ The
Times, October 13, 2000. Commentary: ‘Gore has made his bed, but nobody wants to lie in it.’ Bold
face emphasis added.
3We also identify a speciﬁc parameter constellation in which a federal economy generates
more innovation than a unitary system and, therefore, show that the possibility that a
federal system may generate more public policy innovation, validating the conventional
wisdom that has been vividly expressed in the quotation by Justice Brandeis, is a real
one.6
In the model presented in Section 2, two state governors, each of whom can be
of diﬀerent ability, choose between several experimental policies and a policy with a
certain outcome. After the policy has been implemented, both governors run for the
federal presidency and the winner of the elections chooses a federation-wide policy. In
this framework a learning externality, arising from correlation of policy outcomes across
jurisdictions, exists. This creates incentives for each governor to avoid the cost of ex-
perimentation and, if elected president, to make use of the information procured in the
other state. This incentive, however, is mitigated by two eﬀects: the signaling and the
policy eﬀect. The former eﬀect, and to some extent the most obvious, refers to the
incentive of a governor to signal ability to the electorate by experimenting in order to
win the elections. The policy eﬀect refers to the nature of the federal political career:
a governor anticipating to become president and then to govern the entire nation will
take into account the beneﬁt procured to the other state by her own choice of policy
experimentation. It is the combination, and strength, of these two eﬀects that makes
governors opt for the experimenting public policy.
The outcome of this federal setup is compared with a benchmark of a unitary
nation where a president is responsible for the entire federation. For the unitary case,
we distinguish between a non-democratic benchmark without election, and a nationwide
election where the incumbent president has to face a challenger from the opposition. It
is shown that the federal system is more innovative than both benchmarks provided the
signalling and policy eﬀects are stronger than the learning externality.
6This conclusion, though derived in an entirely diﬀerent context, is reminiscent of the idea that the
existence of a federal government may over-turn the (negative) ineﬃciencies arising from non-cooperative
behavior at the state level, Keen and Kotsogiannis [3].
4The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes
the equilibrium of the model, and Section 4 compares it to the unitary outcome without
election. In Section 5 the model is varied to allow for an election in the unitary system.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We study a dynamic two period model which incorporates signaling and an election
between both periods.7 We abstract, for simplicity, from discounting between the two
periods. There are two states that are identical in all respects. In period 1 in each state
a governor is in charge of choosing policy. In the end of that period both governors run
for the federal presidency. In period 2 the president selects policy for both states.8
Policymakers are of two abilities: high, denoted by α, and low, denoted by α, with,
in particular, α > α > 0. Ability is private information. Each policymaker is of high
ability with probability λ ∈ (0,1). The abilities of the two governors are independent of
each other.
In both periods incumbents decide whether to introduce one out of m new and
innovative public policies where m is a large number. The returns of these policies are
probabilistic and depend on the policymaker’s ability. In particular, exactly one of the
new policies has a high quality,9 denoted by qh + α, while the other m − 1 new policies
are of low quality, denoted by ql + α, where α = α, α and ql > 0.10 Thus, if there
is an experiment with one new policy, it is of high quality with probability θ ≡ 1/m.
Alternatively, the policy makers may use a public policy whose return is certain and
given by qo. This policy can have a dual interpretation: it can be either an old one that
7A variant of this model in the context of a single jurisdiction can be found in Kotsogiannis and
Schwager (forthcoming).
8The issue at the heart of the paper is to compare the incentives of governors for experimentation
arising within a given federal election. Two states are suﬃcient for this purpose. We also abstract from
incentive considerations arising from the re-election of the president of the federation after period 2.
9Policies are costly and, without loss of generality, their cost has been suppressed.
10Combining ability and random policy outcome in an additive speciﬁcation is a convenient way to
describe the main eﬀects while keeping the notational burden to a minimum.
5has been used in the past or a new policy with a certain return. The policies are ranked
according to
qh + α > qh + α > qo > ql + α > ql + α. (1)
The inequalities in (1) guarantee that the return of new policy of high quality chosen by
a low ability policymaker, qh +α, is larger that the return of a new policy that is of low
quality but is chosen by a high ability policymaker, qh+α. Or to put this diﬀerently, the
diﬀerence in the qualities of the policies qh − ql is larger than the diﬀerence in abilities
α − α.
Central to this paper are the incentives of the policymakers to experiment with
innovative public policies and so it is imperative to restrict attention to a policy innova-
tion which is not from the outset superior to the old policy. We, therefore, assume that,
for the high ability policymaker the return from old policy is greater than the expected
return from the new policy that is,
qo > θ(qh − α) + (1 − θ)(ql + α). (2)
It is clear from (2) that for the inequality to hold it must be the case that
θ ≤




(3) simply says that the innovative policy does not provide a short run beneﬁt to a
governor,11 and so any incentive to innovate arises from the dynamic nature of the
model. We turn to this next.
During the ﬁrst period, citizens observe the quality qi (qi = qh + α,qh + α,qo,ql +
α,ql+α) of the policy in both states and form beliefs about the ability of both governors.
The posterior probability that the governor of state i is of high ability given the quality
qi of the policy is denoted by µi(qi). At the end of the ﬁrst period there is an election.
Voting is retrospective and citizens elect for president the governor who is more likely to
be of high ability. That is, if µi > µj,i = 1,2,i  = j, then citizens elect for president the
11Though the restriction in inequality (3) refers to the high ability governor it, too, holds, following
from α > α, for the low ability one.
6governor of state i. In case µi = µj they toss a coin and each governor is elected with
probability 1/2.
The outcome of a speciﬁc experimenting policy is perfectly correlated across states.
This implies that, once a certain new policy is chosen in state i its quality becomes com-
mon knowledge also in state j.12 Consequently, if a successful experiment was performed,
in the sense that an innovative policy turned out to be of high quality, whoever is in
charge of the policy decision in period 2 can use this information in both jurisdictions.
The sequence of events is illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
Insert ﬁgure 1 here.
Policymakers derive utility from the per-period quality of the policy chosen pro-
vided they are in oﬃce. In period 2 the governor who is not elected president receives
zero utility. Speciﬁcally, this implies that being ousted from oﬃce confers lower utility
than any policy outcome.
This model deﬁnes a game between both types of the policymakers in both states.
At the beginning of the game Nature chooses the ability type of both governors. A
strategy for each type of governor in state i = 1,2 consists, ﬁrst, of a policy decision for
state i in the ﬁrst period. The second component is a rule, possibly depending on the
policy outcomes observed in period 1, that speciﬁes the policy choices for both states
in period 2, should the governor of state i be elected as president. An equilibrium of
this game consists of a strategy for each ability type of the governor of each state and
of citizens’ beliefs satisfying two requirements. Firstly, given the beliefs of the citizens
and the strategies of both types of governor in state j  = i, the strategy of the governor
of state i has to be optimal whenever this governor is called upon to decide. Secondly,
the beliefs must be consistent with the governors’ strategies.
12This is for simplicity. Imperfect correlation across states is feasible but it obscures the main forces
at work.
73 The federal system
We start by analyzing the president’s choices in the second period after the ﬁrst period
election. In the second period the president has no re-election motives and thus chooses
the policy which yields her the highest expected quality. This expected quality is deter-
mined as follows. First, there may have been an experiment in the ﬁrst period which has
proved successful. If this is the case, the president is informed that this new policy is of
high quality. Consequently, she then chooses this new policy in both states yielding a
payoﬀ 2(qh + α) where α = α,α is the president’s ability. If one or both governors tried
out new policies but each of these policies showed to be of low quality, the president,
following the ranking of policies in (3), returns to the old policy obtaining the payoﬀ
2qo.13 The same decision is optimal if no state has experimented with a new policy.
As noted in the introductory section, the purpose of this analysis is to investigate
possible interdependencies between political aspirations of state governors for federal
oﬃce and the choice of innovative public policies and, thus, explore the possibility that a
federal system produces more experimentation relative to a unitary system. To progress
towards this we thus concentrate our eﬀorts on establishing the existence of a particular
equilibrium: that in which in both jurisdictions the low ability governor selects the old
policy whereas the high ability governors in both states experiment, but each governor
is choosing a diﬀerent new policy.14 This candidate equilibrium leads to beliefs of the
form
µi(qh + α) = µi(ql + α) = 1, (4)
µi(qh + α) = µi(ql + α) = µi(qo) = 0 i = 1,2.
Consider now, given these beliefs, the choices open to a high ability governor in state
13Since a new policy chosen in the ﬁrst period has been eliminated from the pool of new policies,
the probability of ﬁnding a high quality new policy in the second period will be updated. An updated
version of (3) then holds if m is suﬃciently large. This allows us to not worry about the precise values
of the updated probabilities in every eventuality.
14A full characterization of the equilibria of the model can be provided. This, however, will not
provide any further insights into the eﬀects leading to innovation in a federal system. For the sake of
brevity these equilibria are therefore omitted.
8i, assuming that the governor of state j  = i behaves according to the hypothesized
strategies. If the governor of state i chooses a new policy her expected ﬁrst period payoﬀ
is given by
θ(qh + α) + (1 − θ)(ql + α) . (5)
By this choice, she reveals her high ability to the electorate, ensuring a belief µi = 1. If
the governor of state j is of high ability, her strategy being the same, she also reveals
her type implying µj = 1. In this case the governor of state i wins the election with
probability 1/2. Since, under these strategies, there were two diﬀerent experiments
performed, it is clear that the probability that the policy, in the second period, is of high
quality is 2θ, while with probability 1 − 2θ, both experiments have failed. Conditional
upon winning the election against a high ability competitor from the other state the
expected second period payoﬀ of the governor of state i is thus
2[2θ(qh + α) + (1 − 2θ)qo] . (6)
If, now, the governor of state j is of low ability she chooses the old policy which leads
to, following (4), µj = 0, ensuring that the governor of state i is elected with probability
1. Since now the governor of state i is the only one who tried out a new policy, the
probability that the policy, in the second period, is of high quality is just θ. Thus, if the
governor of state j is of low ability, the second period payoﬀ of the governor of state i is
2[θ(qh + α) + (1 − θ)qo] . (7)
To obtain the expected second period payoﬀ of the governor of state i we ﬁrst multiply
(6) with the prior probability λ, for the event that the governor of state j is of the high
ability type, and with the probability 1/2 of winning the election against this competitor.
Similarly we multiply (7) with λ and 1, and add the results. Adding the expected second
period payoﬀ to (5) ﬁnally yields the total payoﬀ from choosing a new policy
vg(n) ≡ θ(qh + α) + (1 − θ)(ql + α) + 2θ(qh + α) + (1 − 2θ)qo + (1 − λ)qo . (8)
In principle, the governor of state i could as well choose the same new policy
as the governor of state j. With such a choice, in the payoﬀ in (6), the probability
92θ for knowing a good new policy in period 2 would have to be replaced by θ, while
the remaining components of the payoﬀ would not change. Thus, choosing the same
innovation as the other governor, is never preferred to choosing a diﬀerent innovation.
If the governor of state i chooses the old policy the ﬁrst period payoﬀ is qo. Having
chosen the old policy the governor of state i is taken to be, following (4), µi(qo) = 0, of
low ability. If the governor of state j is of high ability, this happens with probability λ,
the governor of state i is defeated in the elections obtaining zero second period payoﬀ.
With probability 1 − λ the governor of state j is of low ability implying µj = 0. In this
case the governor of state i is elected with probability 1/2. Since no experiment has
taken place, the second period payoﬀ for the governor of state i in this case is 2qo. The
total payoﬀ from choosing the old policy, then, is
vg(o) ≡ (2 − λ)qo . (9)
Comparing equations (8) and (9) it is immediate, following from (1) and in particular
qh + α > qo, that vg(n) > vg(o). It is thus optimal for the high ability governor of state
i to choose a new policy.
We now turn to the low ability type governor in state i. If this governor chooses
the old policy then in the ﬁrst period her payoﬀ is qo. In this case she is defeated in the
election, if the governor of state j is of high ability, and she is elected with probability
1/2, if the governor of state j is also of low ability. In the latter case the second period
payoﬀ, conditional on winning the election, is given by 2qo. Consequently, the total
payoﬀ from choosing the old policy for the low ability type, denoted by vg(o), is given
by (9).
If the low ability governor chooses the new policy in the ﬁrst period then the ﬁrst pe-
riod beneﬁt is given by (5), but with α replaced by α. In this case she is elected with prob-
ability 1/2(1 − λ). Since there was one experiment in this case the expected payoﬀ in the
second period, conditional on being elected, is then given by 2[θ(qh + α) + (1 − θ)qo].
Combining ﬁrst and second period payoﬀs one obtains
vg(n) ≡ θ(qh + α) + (1 − θ)(ql + α) + (1 − λ)[θ(qh + α) + (1 − θ)qo] . (10)
10Comparison between equations (9) and (10) reveals that vg(o) ≥ vg(n) if
θ ≤
qo − (ql + α)
(qh − ql) + (1 − λ)(qh + α − qo)
≡ θg . (11)
That is, the low ability governor of state i chooses the old policy if the likelihood that
the new and innovative policy is relatively small in the sense that θ ≤ θg. Following
(1), and in particular the facts that qo > ql + α and qh > qo > ql, θg in (11) is strictly
positive. A simple comparison of (3) and (11) now reveals that θg is below the value of
θ∗, as deﬁned in (3), if α is not too far below α. Restricting attention to this case, we
arrive at:
Proposition 1 For all θ ∈ [0,θg] there exists an equilibrium where in both states the
high ability governor experiments and the low ability governor selects the old policy.
We turn now to the benchmark case in which policies are chosen by the president
of the unitary nation.
4 The unitary nation
The president of the unitary nation in the ﬁrst period chooses the policy for each state.
Consequently, there are four choices open to her. She can choose two diﬀerent new
policies in both states; choose the same new policy in both states; choose a new policy
in one and the old policy in the other state; and choose the old policy in both states.
Consider the high ability type and the ﬁrst of these options. Choosing diﬀerent
new policies in both states in the ﬁrst period she obtains payoﬀ, in each state, given by
(5). In the second period, having experimented twice in the ﬁrst, she obtains a payoﬀ
given by (6). Adding these payoﬀs one obtains
vp(nn) ≡ 2[θ(qh + α) + (1 − θ)(ql + α)] + 2[2θ(qh + α) + (1 − 2θ)qo] . (12)
The second possible choice, consisting of the same new policy in both states gives the
same ﬁrst period payoﬀ. In the second period, the payoﬀ qh + α is obtained only with
probability θ instead of 2θ. Therefore, this strategy is clearly dominated by the previous
11choice. If now she chooses the new policy in one state and the old in the other, in the
ﬁrst period she obtains payoﬀ θ(qh + α)+(1−θ)(ql + α)+qo. In the second period, after
one experiment she knows a successful new policy with probability θ, and thus receives
the payoﬀ given by (7). Total payoﬀ from this choice, then, is
vp(on) = vp(no) ≡ θ(qh + α) + (1 − θ)(ql + α) + qo + 2[θ(qh + α) + (1 − θ)qo]. (13)
Finally, if she chooses the old policy in both states she obtains a total payoﬀ of
vp(oo) ≡ 4qo . (14)
One would expect that the president of the unitary nation will be choosing in both
states a diﬀerent new policy, if the likelihood that the new policy is of good quality is
suﬃciently high. Indeed, comparison of the payoﬀs in (12) and (13), reveals that this is
the case (and so vp(nn) ≥ vp(on)) if
θ ≥
qo − (ql + α)
(qh − ql) + 2(qh + α − qo)
≡ θp . (15)
A comparison now of equations (13) and (14) reveals that vp(on) ≥ vp(oo) if the same
inequality θ ≥ θp is satisﬁed. Conversely, if the reverse inequality holds in (15), then
vp(oo) ≥ vp(on) ≥ vp(nn).
Similarly, following analogous reasoning, the low ability president chooses to exper-
iment in both states state if θ ≥ θp, where θp is deﬁned as θp in (15) but with α replaced
by α. Of course, if the likelihood that the quality of the new policy is suﬃciently small,
in the sense that θ ≤ θp, it is optimal for this type not to innovate at all. It is easy to
verify that the cutoﬀ level of θ (θp) for the low ability president to innovate is strictly
greater than the cutoﬀ θ (θp) for the high ability.15 This is intuitive. For, in this case,
and with a given level of quality, the low ability president receives less payoﬀ than she
would if she was the high ability. Consequently, the low ability type is willing to choose
the new policy if the new policy is more likely, vis a vis the cutoﬀ level of θ required by
the high ability, to be of high quality. Moreover, both θp, θp are positive. Finally, θp is
strictly less than θ∗, which is also true for θp provided that α is not too low. We so have:
15This can be veriﬁed by comparing (15) evaluated at α and α.
12Proposition 2 (i) For all θ ∈ [0,θp], it is optimal for both types of the president of the
unitary nation to choose the old policy in both states.
(ii) For all θ ∈ [θp,θp], it is optimal for the high ability type president of the unitary
nation to choose two diﬀerent new policies in both states. For the low ability type it is
optimal to choose the old policy in both states.
(iii) For all θ ∈ [θp,θ∗], it is optimal for both types of president of the unitary
nation to choose new policies in both states.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in ﬁgure 2.
Insert ﬁgure 2 here.
In order to compare the outcome in the federal system of Proposition 1 with that
of the unitary system of Proposition 2 we now need to relate the critical values θg and θp.
A simple comparison between (11) and (15) (with α replaced by α) shows that θp < θg.
Consequently, the interval [θp,θp] is contained in [0,θg].
To progress further in the comparison, we now deﬁne a measure of innovation. A
natural measure in the present context is the expected number of new policies chosen in
the ﬁrst period. In the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 three cases can arise. If
there is a high ability type governor in both states, which happens with probability λ2,
a new policy is chosen in each state. With probability 2λ(1 − λ) there is a high ability
type governor choosing a new policy in one state only. Finally, with probability (1 − λ)
2
both governors are of low ability type producing no innovation. Altogether the expected
amount of innovation is 2λ2 + 2λ(1 − λ) = 2λ.
Turning now to the choice of the president of the unitary nation, as given in Propo-
sition 2, we observe that for θ < θp there is no innovation. For θ ∈ [θp,θp] the president
chooses a new policy in both states if she is of high ability but none if she is of low
ability. In this case the amount of innovation is 2λ. Finally, for θ ∈ [θp,θ∗], whatever the
type of the president, she chooses new policies in both states. The amount of innovation
is, then, 2. Summarizing:
13Proposition 3 In a federal system the expected number of innovations is larger than in
the unitary nation for all θ ∈ [0,θp). For all [θp,θp], the federal and the unitary systems
produce the same expected number of innovations. For all θ ∈ (θp,θg] the federal system
produces less innovation than the unitary nation.
The trade-oﬀ leading to the optimal decision of the president of the unitary nation,
as stated in Proposition 2, is rather intuitive. On the one hand, innovation is costly
because in expected terms a new policy fares worse than the old policy in period 1.
On the other hand, the information produced in period 1 by experimenting allows for
a higher payoﬀ in the second period. Therefore, if θ is not too low, as in case (ii) of
Proposition 2 for the high ability type, and in case (iii) for both types, the learning
beneﬁt outweighs the short term cost of innovation. Hence, the president of the unitary
nation ﬁnds it optimal to innovate.16 If, conversely, θ is too low, then no innovation
takes place in the unitary nation.
In the federal system the same trade-oﬀ exists because the governors, too, have an
incentive to learn. The diﬀerence between the two systems arises from two considerations
introduced by electoral competition. Firstly, with the probability for each governor of
winning the election being less than one, the beneﬁt of learning is not fully internal-
ized. Secondly, the high ability governor enhances her electoral prospects by innovating,
thereby communicating her ability to voters. For this type, the electoral beneﬁt always
outweighs the costs of innovation. To see this clearly, consider the extreme case where
the new policy is of low quality with certainty, that is, θ = 0. Switching from the new
to the old policy confers a ﬁrst period gain of qo but in the same time reduces the prob-
ability of winning the election by 1/2. Since the second period payoﬀ, conditional on
being elected president, is 2qo, deviating to the old policy does not pay oﬀ. Thus, the
high ability governor innovates even if there is no beneﬁt from learning. Obviously, in
the case where both governors are of high ability both have the same electoral motives
to innovate. Consequently, in this case, there may be double innovation in the federal
16In our simple formulation, the marginal learning beneﬁt of an additional innovation does not de-
crease. Therefore, a corner solution arises where innovation occurs either in all states or not at all.
14system even if the learning beneﬁt is negligible.
A low ability governor prefers not to reveal her ability to the voters and hence she
has no electoral motive for choosing the new policy. As a consequence, her decision is
entirely determined by the trade-oﬀ faced also by the president of the unitary nation:
The trade-oﬀ, that is, between the short term costs of innovation and the beneﬁt of
learning. Because of the information externality, θg, the minimum value for θ such that
she innovates, is higher than θp, the minimum value of θ required to induce the low ability
type of the president of the unitary nation to innovate. For this reason, if θ is between
these values, the federal system produces less innovation than the unitary nation. The
comparison described in Proposition 3 is illustrated in ﬁgure 3.
Insert ﬁgure 3 here.
5 Opposition candidates
In the present section, we change the model such that also the president has to stand
for re-election. Lacking any competing incumbent from a diﬀerent state, however, a
challenger in such an election has to be an opposition politician who does not currently
hold any oﬃce. Since this politician does not take any policy decision, citizens will believe
that she is of high ability with the prior probability λ. In order to keep the institutional
setups comparable, we also introduce a third contender, whose belief is given by the prior
λ, in the election in the federal system. Finally, the behavior of the voters is essentially
the same as before. Speciﬁcally, citizens elect the candidate to whom they assign the
highest belief of being of high ability. If there are several such candidates, the votes will
be split among them.
For the federal system, we again consider an equilibrium where high ability gov-
ernors choose diﬀerent new policies while low ability governors stick to the old policy.
This implies the same beliefs as in the equilibrium analyzed in Section 3. A governor
who has chosen a new policy reveals her type, and any governor who chooses the old
policy is taken to be of low ability. Thus, in such an equilibrium, a high ability governor
15who innovates still beats a low ability type governor with certainty. Moreover, she also
beats the challenger since the voters assign only belief λ < 1 to this unknown contender.
Finally, if the other governor is also of high ability, the two governors are preferred to
the challenger and elected with probability 1/2 each. Thus, for a high ability governor,
the payoﬀ from choosing a new policy remains vg(n) as given in (8).
Contrary to this, if the governor chooses the old policy, her election chances are
aﬀected by the presence of the challenger. The reason is that the citizens prefer the
challenger, who may be of high ability with positive probability, to any candidate whom
they believe to be of low ability with certainty. By consequence, choosing the old policy
results in a sure defeat, yielding a total payoﬀ of qo. Since this is lower than the corre-
sponding payoﬀ vg(o) given in (9) in the model without opposition candidate, a governor
of the high ability type will still choose to innovate for all θ.
By the same reasoning, the presence of the challenger makes it impossible for a
low ability type governor to win the election. Whether she chooses the new or the old
policy, citizens will always assign belief 0 to her and elect either the other governor or
the challenger. As a consequence, the second period payoﬀ of a low ability type governor
is zero. This however, following on (3), eliminates any incentive to choose a new policy
in the ﬁrst period. To summarize, we note that the hypothesized equilibrium exists for
all θ ∈ [0,θ∗].
In the unitary system, we now have a game between the presidents of both types,
where in an equilibrium, citizens form beliefs consistent with the strategies of both types.
We consider equilibria such that a low ability type president chooses the old policy in both
states whereas a high ability president innovates at least once. With these strategies,
citizens will attach a belief of 0 to a president who chooses the old policy in both states.
Just like a low ability type governor, a low ability type president facing a challenger
with belief λ will certainly lose the election. Since the old policy provides a higher payoﬀ
in the ﬁrst period, it will therefore be chosen by the low type president in both states.
The high ability type president will be considered to be of the low ability type if she
chooses the old policy in both states. Thus, after this ﬁrst period choice she will lose the
16election against the challenger, implying a total payoﬀ of 2qo. If instead she chooses a new
policy in one state and the old policy in the other state, her high ability will be known
to the electorate, ensuring a re-election with probability 1. Given that there was just
one experiment in the ﬁrst period, this yields an overall payoﬀ vp(on) as given in (13).
This clearly exceeds 2qo, implying that it is not optimal for the high ability president
to choose the old policy in both states. Finally, choosing two diﬀerent innovations in
the two states, the president again is re-elected with certainty. Taking into account the
fact that now there were two experiments, the total payoﬀ in this case is vp(nn) as in
(12). From the analysis in Section 4 we know already that vp(nn) ≥ vp(on) if and only
if θ ≥ θp. Hence, we have an equilibrium where the high ability type president chooses
one innovation for θ ≤ θp, and we have an equilibrium where she experiments twice if
θ ≥ θp.
Comparing the innovation scores in both setups, we notice that in the federal
system, the expected number of new policies in the ﬁrst period is now 2λ for all θ ∈ [0,θ∗].
In the unitary system, this number is λ if θ ∈ [0,θp) and 2λ for θ ∈ (θp,θ∗]. Summarizing:
Proposition 4 If an opposition politician runs against the president and the governors,
then the expected number of innovations is higher in a federal system than in a unitary
one if θ ∈ [0,θp). Both systems produce the same expected number of innovations if
θ ∈ (θp,θ∗].
Proposition 4 is illustrated in ﬁgure 4. A comparison of ﬁgures 3 and 4 shows how the
incentives of the president of a unitary nation change if she has to stand in an election.
For the high ability type, it now pays oﬀ to signal ability to voters, as it does for a high
ability type governor. However, since there is only one president, one single innovation
is suﬃcient to achieve this. This contrasts with the federal system where every high
ability type governor wants to produce the signal. Therefore, for low values of θ, the
federal system is still more innovative than the unitary system with elections, although
the diﬀerence is smaller than in the case, studied in Proposition 3, without election in
the unitary state. For the low ability type president, the contest with the challenger
17has the opposite eﬀect. This type never innovates if she is subject to an election since
she is ejected with certainty, and thus has no incentive at all to learn. When electoral
competition is introduced, politicians with good prospects in the election invest more in
winning, and so are more inclined to experiment. In the same time, those who expect to
lose reduce their eﬀort of ﬁnding solutions, the beneﬁt of which will occur only after the
end of their own term, and so decrease innovative activity. The ﬁrst eﬀect, however, is
stronger in the federal system since all governors are potentially hopeful contenders for
the presidency.
Insert ﬁgure 4 here.
6 Concluding remarks
Conventional wisdom has it that federalism promotes policy innovation. In contrast,
recent research has emphasized that a multi-jurisdictional system is characterized by
under-provision of policy innovation. The present paper has presented a simple model
introducing political competition into the analysis of a federal system. Its objective
has been to emphasize that political aspirations might play an important role in the
determination of the level of experimentation in federal systems. For, as shown in the
equilibrium analyzed, a tradeoﬀ occurs between a learning incentive which is indeed
stronger in a unitary system, and an electoral motive to signal ability by innovating
which is stronger in the federal system. Thus, when the electoral motive dominates,
policy innovation occurs more frequently than in a unitary nation. This shows that once
such motives are accounted for, the conventional wisdom, that a federal system may be
associated with more innovation relative to a unitary system, may be validated.
To put this result into perspective, the analysis has been purely positive and not
normative. It remains an open question whether the tendency to innovate in a federation
is beneﬁcial to citizens. To progress on this issue one would need to carefully specify the
appropriate benchmark and, in particular, deﬁne, independently from the institutional
setup, the set of policy makers from which the president in period 2 can be chosen.
18Things in reality are, of course, much more complicated than it has been actually
presented here. The model thus suggests a number of extensions. Firstly, learning
across states and between periods may be less than perfect. Secondly, the signal about
the governor’s ability conveyed by innovating may not be fully informative. Finally,
another avenue for research is to incorporate other forms of political competition in
federal systems. Certainly, there remains much scope for the analysis of experimentation
in richer models of political competition. We hope to have shown that the task is
worthwhile and that the conclusions can be instructive.
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Figure 1: The sequence of events.
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Figure 2: The optimal choice of the president of a unitary nation.
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Figure 3: The innovation score.
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Figure 4: The innovation score with opposition candidates.
22